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Recently, political actors in Tanzania have demanded compensation from Germany for
colonial atrocities against various ethnic and religious groups during the Maji-Maji
uprising (1905–1907). By analyzing first-hand archival records from Germany and Tanza-
nia, this article examines whether German actions constitute genocide according to the
Genocide Convention or the International Criminal Tribunals’ jurisprudence. The authors
find strong evidence to support a claim of genocide, and assess the viability of potential
compensation claims against Germany; they conclude, however, that such claims would
meet significant obstacles due to the concept of state immunity for sovereign actions
under international customary law, as well as case law of the International Court of
Justice.
In early 2017, the National Assembly of Tanzania demanded an apology and compensation from
Germany for “colonial atrocities.” The country’s minister of defense, Dr. Hussein Mwinyi, assured
Parliament of his readiness to negotiate compensation with his German counterpart;1 however, when
Germany’s minister of foreign affairs, Heiko Maas, visited Tanzania a year later, both ministers
declared that they found other ways to address this past.2 The Tanzanian Assembly’s resolution had
stopped short of calling the colonial atrocities, committed by German troops during the Maji-Maji
uprising (1905–1907), a genocide. Some scholars, however, have done so, and have reviewed the
appropriateness of the label in in the context of Germany’s colonial policy and the quashing of the
insurrection in particular.3 Influenced by the public’s and the media’s growing eagerness to assess
past colonial atrocities through the lens of the relatively modern concept of genocide, researchers of
international law, genocide studies, and memory politics have submitted an ever increasing volume
of historical evidence and narratives to test the definition and concept of genocide.4 Some also have
problematized the tensions between the law and historiography.5 Genocide claims (legal and pub-
lic) can distort the process of dealing with difficult histories6 by exacerbating academic and public
debates about the past, thus limiting the realm of the historian and broadening the field of the judge.7
Very often, the concept of genocide, when applied to older real-world cases, is undefined, flexible,
or tailored to explain why a certain event was genocidal. Often it invokes the 1948 Convention for
the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (the Genocide Convention), the mean-
ing and scope of which have been interpreted and broadened by the jurisprudence of international
courts and tribunals.
Here we take a different approach, by presenting a brief history of German colonialism in
East Africa, analyzing the atrocities committed there during the quashing of the Maji-Maji upris-
ing, and then summarizing the character of the violations that took place. In our conclusion, we
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assess the evidence from published and unpublished sources in light of the most current concepts of
genocide. These concepts include not only the Genocide Convention’s definition, but also landmark
judgements and decisions by international criminal tribunals, most notably the International Crimi-
nal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
(ICTR).
German Colonialism in East Africa
German colonialism in Africa began primarily as a private endeavor, driven by audacious, and often
ruthless, traders. Initially signing agreements with warlords and the leaders of local ethnic groups,
they then lobbied the government for control over the territories they believed they had secured for
the German Empire (Kaiserreich). Under Chancellor Otto von Bismarck the Empire was reluc-
tant to acquiesce to these traders. State engagement in colonial adventures occurred only after
entrepreneurs—intending to privatize the profits and leave the state the costs of providing secu-
rity and diplomatic shelter—intensively lobbied Bismarck.8 Though colonialism proved profitable
for some private investors, it became a subsidy-devouring undertaking for the state.9 Even today
there is no consensus as to why the state continued its colonial operations, whether it be ideology,10
a desire to divert public attention away from domestic conflicts,11 a reaction to the social and political
challenges of modern capitalism,12 or anxiety over the spread of globalization.13
In the second half of 1884, the German explorer and adventurer Carl Peters, who had studied
British colonialism and promoted a colonialist agenda in Germany, arrived in Zanzibar. He travelled
first to the Usagara region of Tanganyika and then further into Uganda, negotiating several treaties
with local leaders without the consent of the German government. His ruthless behavior towards
the native population triggered a scandal in the German press.14 In 1890, the German government
decided to take over administration of the colonies, whichGerman traders and travelers had secured.
The colonies’ legal status was never clearly established; they were neither part of Germany proper,
nor regarded as foreign countries. To reduce the cost of administration, governance rested on a
few German officers with substantial unchecked power, who recruited African and Arab fighters
(called Askari) to suppress resistance on the ground. Abuse of power was rampant in this system,
and provoked rather than prevented resistance. By the end of the nineteenth century, German troops
had brutally quashed the uprising of the Wahehe.15
German expansion came at a time of war and forced migration in East Africa, triggered by
the breakdown of several polities, the shift of the slave trade from the West to the East Coast, and
the interference of powerful Arab warlords and traders. The breakdown of the Zulu Kingdom sent
shockwaves across the continent, and after the assassination of King Shaka, its internal conflicts
displaced thousands of people, some of whom escaped the turmoil to southern Tanganyika, where
they established new polities.16
Before the 1905 Maji-Maji uprising, Germany lacked effective control over the territory of
Tanganyika.17 Though the German government operated several coastal ports, and some isolated
trading centers in the interior, colonial power rested on indirect rule and the recruitment of local
mercenaries, who killed and looted under the command of German officers. Some of these Askari
came from inside the colony, while others were recruited from neighboring countries and other
German colonies. The Askari system prevented solidarity between the German mercenaries and the
local population, while at the same time stimulating hatred between different ethnic groups. The
administration was comprised of native representatives in small settlements. These representatives
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were called “Jumben,” but were under the control of German-appointed “Akiden,” who were very
often foreign to the local communities and of Arab descent. With the help of these two groups, the
German administration extracted taxes and issued orders, imposing economic conditions that often
caused even more resistance and protest among local populations.18
TheGermans imposed foreign rule, collected taxes, introduced boundaries between land plots,
and made reluctant tax payers perform forced labor. Because it was primarily African soldiers who
exercised violence against the population, oppression became associated with the Askari rather than
the Germans. This left a legacy of interethnic conflict even after the German troops, having com-
mitted atrocities, exited the region. In addition, the Askari committed the most heinous cruelties,
often acting without orders—but under the indifferent eyes of German officers.
The conflicts in German East Africa broke out when the Germans started to replace the “hut,”
or household, tax with a head tax in order to increase the colony’s profitability. The new tax forced
native workers to produce surpluses in order to pay the taxes. Those who failed to meet these
increased obligations were sent to work on communal plantations, mostly cotton, a popular and
profit-yielding cash crop in East Africa. This system allowed the colony to produce surpluses that
it could sell on the world market, making it economically sustainable from the perspective of the
mainland. Like other German colonies (Cameroon, Togo, and German South-West Africa), East
Africa had a trade deficit with the mainland and required subsidies.19
TheMaji-Maji uprising began as a rebellion against Arab traders and cotton plantation owners
in theMalumbi Hills of the southeastern coast.20 Usually the insurgents would first uproot the cotton
plants, and then raid farmhouses or office buildings. A cult-like religious movement united disparate
fighters and warring groups, allowing individual fighters to overcome the free-riding dilemma and
the German Askaris’ supremacy in weaponry.21 As Iliffe has shown, though the religious component
was strong, tribal organizations were weak. The raids transformed gradually into a peasants’ revolt
as the violence progressed into the interior.22
Numerous scholars have offered different explanations as to how the violence spread from
the Southeast to the interior. Some see events as a sequence of separate regional uprisings.23 Oth-
ers point to participants taking advantage of an opportunity to settle accounts with the Germans,
or avenge long-standing and territorial grudges against neighboring groups.24 In the aftermath of
Tanzania’s struggle for independence and debates about colonialism, authors increasingly inter-
preted the Maji-Maji uprising as “an example of the African struggle against colonialism,” or an
“explosion of African hatred against European rule,”25 presenting it as a unitary anticolonial move-
ment without internal divisions.26 Regional micro-studies, on the other hand, have exposed older
tensions between groups and inside tribes.27 Many of the groups that fought against the Schutztruppe
(colonial army) were also fighting each other, and the Schutztruppe’s use of Askari from different eth-
nic groups only intensified existing antagonisms. Other groups too saw the uprising as an opportunity
to rid themselves of their constraints or simply to rob their neighbors.28
Once the Maji-Maji war had broken out and the Germans decided to quash it, war crimes
were the rule rather than the exception. One of the first crimes was the murder of Bishop Cassian
Spiess in Kilwa. He had ignored the local authorities’ warnings, and a mob killed him together with
two priests and two nuns while the group was on their way from Kilwa. Word about the insurgents’
success in killing such influential people spread across the country, encouraging others to join the
uprising.29 The bishop had carried weapons which the local administration had given him, advising
him to stay at home. He had also been denied Askari support, but witnesses testified that he had
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made his status as a non-combatant clear in his conversation with the crowd. The crowd killed him
regardless. As a result of themany attacks, clerics armed themselves to fight back. Missionary stations
became deserted or fortified, and priests turned into combatants.30
The first attacks came as a complete surprise to theGermans, who immediately launched large-
scale recruitment of Askari, even including fighters from Germany’s Pacific colonies.31 Insurgents
attacked and killed not only Germans, but also other Europeans, Askari, Indians, Arabs, and Black
traders on the coast. The difference between civilians and combatants became blurred—Germans
attacked both groups indiscriminately, and insurgents assaulted Askari, as well as missionaries and
traders.32
At its height, roughly twenty different ethnic groups allied against the German troops, but
many others used the insurgency to settle accounts with their neighbors or to side with the German
Askari. Even the Wahehe, against whom the German Schutztruppe had launched a scorched earth
policy eight years earlier, sided with the Germans. They abducted women and children in order
to prevent them from aiding hostile warriors in the bush, killed prisoners of war, looted villages,
destroyed crops, and tortured surrendering enemies to extort intelligence.33
Schutztruppen commander Theodor von Hirsch, the former station chief of Mpapua, wrote a
diary in which he admitted that he felt “like a murderer, arsonist, and slave trader,” but did nothing to
stop the atrocities, and even paid his warriors a lump sum for decapitated heads.34 He was not alone.
Fighters on all sides of the conflict tended not to only kill individual combatants, but entire villages.
They destroyed food and crops to weaken support for their enemies, leaving civilians without any
means to survive. Reports from the local administration to the governor did not hide these facts. “A
lot of crops were destroyed by us. Food shortage is not excluded,” wrote the head of the Lindi district
to the governor. The head of the German administration in Lindi wondered whether the locals would
be able to pay the fee the governor had imposed on the villages that had joined the insurrection,
because “Their huts and stocks are destroyed.”35 In a message to Berlin, General Ludwig Glatzel in
Dar es Salam described the actions of a Navy officer who had “attacked and destroyed a village.”36
Even after insurgents surrendered, the Germans typically executed them (especially local leaders)
after cursory “courts martial.”37
When the dust on the numerous battlefields settled, the Maji-Maji uprising ended in a three-
year long mass starvation that devastated a large part of the southern territory. Young mothers were
unable to feed their new-born babies, and infant mortality rose dramatically. Southern Usagara was
entirely depopulated by 1906, in Ulanga 25 percent of the women had become unable to become
pregnant. The Germans incurred only a handful of casualties—fifteen White soldiers, 389 Askaris,
and sixty-six porters.38 Additionally, the war facilitated the spread of trypanosomiasis (sleeping sick-
ness), because the flies followed animal migration into depopulated regions. Official German records
estimated the number ofMaji-Maji casualties at 75,00039; KamanaGwassa concludes that there were
in fact 250,000 to 300,00040; Tanja Bührer gives a figure of 250,000, which includes those who died
from disease and starvation.41 Demographic consequences were starkly visible in Tabora, whose dis-
trict officer claimed that the local population had fallen almost by half. Based on tax estimations, he
calculated that the region’s 750,000 to one million inhabitants had declined to 500,000.42 The mis-
sions in Tabora lamented the emigration of the male workforce to the coastal area, which caused
problems for remaining family members, the missionaries’ work, and agriculture.43
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The Quashing of the Maji-Maji Uprising in the Light of International Law
After the Congo Conference of 1884 to 1885,44 and the ratification of the Congo Act,45 Germany
gained control of Tanganyika, securing its governance over the following years. At the beginning of
the twentieth century, ethnic groups in German East Africa were not protected under international
humanitarian law, even though the Maji-Maji fighters met the criteria for combatants according to
the International Convention on the Laws and Customs ofWar on Land (later the Hague II Conven-
tion of 1899)46 they openly carried weapons, wore distinct emblems, and reported to commanders.
ThoughGermany had not ratified theHague II Convention, it can be argued that theMajiMaji fight-
ers were, according to theMartens Clause,47 entitled to the Convention’s protection if they operated
“in accordance with the laws and customs of war.” Given that the insurrectionists were unfamiliar
with those European “laws and customs” of war, they did not always uphold analogous standards,
and often committed (from the perspective of the Hague II Convention) war crimes. Their actions,
however, did not exempt German soldiers and the Askaris from their obligation to uphold the Con-
vention, at least with respect to those Maji-Maji fighters that followed the basic norms of European
warfare.
Indeed, long before theMaji-Maji uprising, Germany had signed the Red Cross Convention of
1864,48 which obliged its armed forces to spare wounded enemy combatants.49 One could therefore
argue that this constituted international “customary” law.50 But while legal continuity extends from
the German Empire, whose troops conducted the war in Tanganyika, to today’s Federal Republic
of Germany, no such continuity connects the ethnic groups that took part in the Maji-Maji uprising
to the Republic of Tanzania today. Therefore, Germany bears responsibility as a state for the crimes
that occurred during its colonial rule, but present-day Tanzania cannot claim to represent the ethnic
groups who suffered as a result of the uprising. By the same token, of course, Tanzania cannot be
held responsible for atrocities or war crimes committed by indigenous fighters during the Maji-Maji
uprising.
These arguments help to gauge state responsibility for atrocities committed during the Maji-
Maji uprising, but they do not establish whether the atrocities committed by German officers and
Askaris, and the policy of the Kaiserreich in German East Africa, qualify as genocidal under today’s
legal definitions. Though these actors violated the Red Cross andHague Conventions that applied to
Germany between 1905 and 1907, do they fulfil the requirements of today’s International Criminal
Law’s concept of genocide?
Quashing the Maji-Maji Uprising under International Criminal Law
The precursor to the Genocide Convention, UN General Assembly Resolution 96 (I) of 1946, noted
that, historically, “many instances of such crimes of genocide have occurred when racial, religious,
political and other groups have been destroyed, entirely or in part” (p. 189). This framing clearly
referred to a wide range of historical episodes beyond theHolocaust. The Genocide Convention nar-
rowed down the UN Resolution of 1946 by referring only to four protected groups (racial, national,
ethnic, or religious groups), while leaving aside “political” or any other groups. There is a clear indi-
cation in the travaux préparatoires (official record of negotiation) of the Genocide Convention that
many states (not the majority) had reservations about the list of protected groups. Those states that
opposed the inclusion of political groups argued that political groups are relatively fluid and not as
stable as racial groups.51 Given the Convention’s definition of protected groups, determining which
of the various warring groups during the Maji-Maji war would actually deserve the Convention’s
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protection is a tricky issue. Neither the records, nor the memoirs of the main perpetrators, tell us
which group or groups the German government intended to destroy, whether in whole or in part.
The Germans hardly ever distinguished ethnic groups, or, as they more commonly referred to them,
“tribes,” and usually wrote about “Negroes” (Neger) and “Blacks” (Schwarze) who either were on
their side or against them. But these categorizations do not fit the Genocide Convention’s definition
of racial, national, ethnic, or religious groups. An additional issue complicating the application of the
Genocide Convention to the Maji-Maji uprising, is that neither “Blacks” nor “Negroes” are objec-
tively existing groups; Massai, Ngoni, andWahehe, however, are. Since 1946, however, international
jurisprudence has shifted away from a static view of the four-protected-groups, allowing for a more
flexible definition.
Although the international community (and individual states) have had several opportunities
since the adoption of the Genocide Convention to amend the “protected groups” definition, the
major international instruments (ICTY Statute, ICTR Statute, Rome Statute of the ICC) and the
domestic laws of several states simply incorporated the definition of “genocide” in the Genocide
Convention. It was the ICTR’s landmark decision of 1998 on genocide in Prosecutor v. Akayesu
which opened the door for a more flexible understanding. In Akayesu, the ICTR acknowledged that
protected groups other than these four may exist. For a new group to be protected, however, it must
have similar qualities to the groups explicitly protected, most importantly, it must be “stable and
permanent.”52 The ICTR also construed the concept of a “national group” as “a collection of people
who are perceived to share a legal bond based on common citizenship, coupled with reciprocity of
rights and duties.”53 This construction has since been accepted by the ICTY with few substantive
changes, confirming, again, the view that even relatively “creative” or “activist” international judges
were not willing to depart from the basic definition of genocide.54 As for other protected groups,
the ICTR followed the mainstream definition in Akayesu: an “ethnic group is generally defined as
a group whose members share a common language or culture.”55 Furthermore, it defined a racial
group as one “based on the hereditary physical traits often identified with a geographical region,
irrespective of linguistic, cultural, national or religious factors.”56 Finally, in terms of the definition
of a religious group, the ICTR Trial Chamber held that this group was one “whose members share
the same religion, denomination or mode of worship.”57
Anotable aspect of post-Akayesu jurisprudencewas developed by the ICTY in Jelisić to address
whether a protected group needs to exist objectively or only in the mind of perpetrators. This is
especially relevant for the context of German East Africa during the Maji-Maji uprising, because a
plethora of ethnic and religious groups existed even though the Germans perceived only one. They
were persecuted because their oppressors saw them as one homogeneous and stable group with
“specific” features and characteristics, which in return served as a justification for their persecu-
tion. Therefore, applying Akayesu and Jelisić to the Maji-Maji uprising arguably makes these groups
victims under the Genocide Convention.
In Jelisić, the ICTY supported such an interpretation, and held that the existence of a national
or ethnic group can be judged from the perspective of the perpetrators. If the perpetrator believes
that a group existed, then its members should be protected per the letter and the spirit of the
Genocide Convention. This subjectivist approach was in fact followed by the ICTR in cases such as
Kajelijeli58 and Semanza.59 Thismakes for amore fluid notion of “protected groups,” even though the
four categories of 1948 remain intact. If we apply the Genocide Convention and recent international
jurisprudence retrospectively, then objectively differing groups in East Africa must be regarded as
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retroactively protected because the Germans saw them as one hostile entity obstructing their rule in
Tanganyika, and they did not deserve mercy because of their alleged inferiority. Still, this conclusion
stems from international jurisprudence, but it does not yet prove that their treatment amounted to
genocide.
Despite the dominant conception of genocide as a mass atrocity, the legal definition does not
require proof of large-scale killings. Whether one views it in qualitative or quantitative terms, the
intention must be to destroy at least a substantial part of a protected group.60 Not even murder is
necessary to obtain a legal ruling of genocide. The definition includes the concept of “deliberately
inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole
or in part.” It is therefore not necessary to directly murder an entire group. If an organization, an
army, or a state organ creates conditions designed (regardless of whether they succeed) to destroy
an ethnic, religious, national, or racial group partly or entirely, they may be found guilty of genocide.
The criminal intent under the Genocide Convention does not need to be directed towards killing all
or a large portion of that group’s members: it is enough if the perpetrator intends to destroy the group
(for example) through torture and “causing bodily harm” to its members.61 The crucial requirement
is that the ultimate victim must be the protected group, which the perpetrator seeks to destroy as a
group.62
The weakness of the influence that the German commanders exercised over their Askari troops
does not exonerate the former from responsibility—at least not as long as they effectively controlled
their soldiers in the field, or could punish them after the fact. Under the concept of “command
responsibility,” a commander has a duty to make use of information about crimes committed by his
soldiers, if such information is available to him. If he does nothing, fails to prevent a subsequent
crime (despite having the power to do so) or punish the perpetrators afterwards, he is either guilty
of neglect or of the crime itself.63 German commanders might not have ordered crimes, and they
may, in many cases, not even have known about the atrocities their Askari committed, but they had
the duty to punish them upon gaining knowledge of their deeds. German commanders did punish
Askari, frequently and harshly, but hardly ever for atrocities they had committed. Usually, German
officers meted out punishment for lack of loyalty, for ignoring orders, or for errors in battle. Cruelty
to civilians, killing wounded or surrendered enemy fighters, and destroying homesteads without
any military significance, were not crimes that merited punishment. While this testifies to German
commanders’ responsibility for atrocities and their unwillingness to punish them (thus constituting
the basis for possible war crimes liability), it does not necessarily denote specifically genocidal intent.
The practice of scorched earth policies in the colony cannot be attributed to one central order,
but rather resulted from several initiatives by commanders in German East Africa, or from the esca-
lation of violence.64 Because there is no evidence of local commanders being punished by their
superiors, one could argue that the upper echelons of the German command were unaware of the
atrocities; however, their lack of knowledge would not exonerate them, just like the absence of orders
from above would not absolve them of guilt. While there is no direct evidence of a genocidal mens
rea among the German commanders at any level, circumstantial evidence suggests that the German
administration wanted not only to destroy members of hostile ethnic groups, but also the groups as
a whole by depriving them of their elites and leadership. In November 1905, von Götzen issued an
order regulating the duties to be imposed on surrendering insurgent groups and villages. The first
condition was the surrender of local leaders and those whom the German authorities referred to as
“the wizards” (i.e. those who spread the Maji-Maji cult).65 The order to the commanders in the field
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does not contain any explicit order to kill them, but from the entirety of the records one may con-
clude that they were to be executed. This was likely intended to deprive these ethnic groups of their
traditional leaders. A problem, however, lies in the order’s justification: von Götzen did not order the
killing of insurgent leaders because he wanted to deprive these groups of their hierarchies in order to
destroy them, but because he wanted to punish these leaders for their participation in the uprising.
Groups which had stayed away from theMaji-Maji were not targeted. Despite all their racist disdain
for the natives, the predominant criterion for targeting leaders was not race, but participation in
the uprising. Yet for the local peoples, the result was the same: the war led to the extinction of “a
whole generation,” according to Seeberg, “whose members had learned to think in categories which
exceeded the horizon of their own tribe.”66 Many groups lost their traditional rulers and their very
existence fell into peril after the destruction of their villages, crops, and livestock. The Germans also
“forcibly transferred” some groups to other parts of the country—punishable today as a war crime
(if against belligerents) or crime against humanity (if against a civilian population).67
German records provide many examples of how the reprisal killings of leaders undermined
these groups’ internal hierarchies, cohesion, and customs, which in turn enabled conflicts within
groups. The elimination of native leaders helped the Germans strengthen their grip on local commu-
nities. A report from Tabora shows that locals tended to challenge their new leaders more, often by
inviting German administrators to intervene. This undermined these new leaders’ authority, while
creating conflict in these communities.68 In light of these records, the Germans might well have
succeeded in destroying some groups “as such” (per the Rome Statute of the International Criminal
Court), but the records do not show the necessary criminal intent.
Within the administrative and archival records of the Maji-Maji uprising, there survives no
proof that the Germans directly incited genocide or issued an order to exterminate a particular
ethnic group. The ICTY’s jurisprudence about Srebrenica in 1995, however, especially the trial and
appeals judgments in Krstić,69 permit one to infer genocidal intent from “culpable acts.”70 In this
case the judges concluded from the accused’s orders to deport women and children from Srebrenica
while ordering the execution of men and boys (regardless of whether they had been combatants
or civilians) that he intended to destroy the national group of Bosnian Muslims “in part,” and that
this “part” was significant enough to have impacted the viability of the entire group.71 They based
their ruling partly on their understanding of the patriarchal character of Bosnian Muslim society, in
which men are crucial for the survival of the group.72 The same can be said of German retribution in
Tanganyika. Just as the Bosnian Serb forces did not persecute BosnianMuslims who allied with them
against other Bosnian Muslims, ninety years earlier the Germans did not attack communities and
leaders who lent them support. And, just like the boys andmen in Srebrenica, themale leaders of the
ethnic groups of Tanganyika that rebelled were crucial for the survival of those groups: their death
left a lasting impact.73 German commanders were aware, as well, of the impact of their scorched
earth policy on the groups they suppressed. This policy and the Germans’ tendency to attack the
civilian population through starvation to force combatants to surrender, constituted the “culpable
acts,” which testified to their “genocidal intent.”
In October 1905, Hauptmann Curt von Wangenheim presented the scorched earth strategy
as a means of ending partisan warfare by starvation: “If the still remaining food is consumed and
people’s homes are destroyed and they lose the possibility to cultivate new fields because we conduct
continuous raids, then they will have to give up their resistance.”74 Even some missionaries joined
the calls to fight the insurgents through starvation.75 Subsequently, the German troops destroyed
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fields and crops so widely that they endangered their own food supplies. It is worth bearing in mind
that von Götzen justified the strategy of starving the enemy not only by military exigency, but by
pointing to the “inferiority” of the enemy.76
Conclusion
If the German command’s strategy was to destroy entire settlements (crops, harvests, and food), kill
civilians along with combatants, coerce the surrender of entire groups through deliberate starvation,
and to intentionally deprive ethnic groups of the leadership that was crucial to their survival—then
Germany’s conduct in East Africa deserves the label of genocide. The scale of the atrocities and the
number of victims relative to the population in Tanganyika was much larger than in Srebrenica; we
have seen, however, under the Genocide Convention and international law the quantitative versus
qualitative aspects are not determinative, as long as the impact of the conduct was substantial for the
group in question. In neither Srebrenica nor Tanganyika can we point to any explicit order to prove
genocidal intent, but in both cases that intent can be inferred from the perpetrators’ actions.
Today the question of criminal liability for genocide in Tanganyika has no legal-technical rel-
evance, because during the Maji-Maji uprising the very concept of genocide was unknown to all
parties in the conflict. In legal terms, the issue of war crimes is more relevant, because the Red
Cross Convention and the Hague II Convention were in force at the time and obliged the Germans
(and their antagonists) to spare wounded fighters, accept the latter’s surrender, treat prisoners of war
humanely, and spare the civilian population. Because the Federal Republic of Germany acknowl-
edges legal continuity with the German Empire, it bears legal responsibility for the Kaiserreich’s
actions. On the other hand, there is no legal continuity between the various ethnic groups of German
East Africa and today’s Republic of Tanzania. Therefore, the issue cuts both ways: Tanzania cannot
be held accountable for these groups’ violations of the Hague II Convention, but it also cannot lodge
lawsuits against Germany on their behalf. Moreover, no current international court or tribunal wields
the necessary jurisdiction over crimes and compensation claims for deeds that took place more than
a hundred years ago. Plaintiffs from Tanzania could sue the German government, but in both Ger-
man and Tanzanian domestic courts Germany would enjoy immunity for sovereign actions (actiones
jure imperii). The current position of the International Court of Justice seems to be that past war-
like campaigns fall under state sovereignty, even if such actions were accompanied by war crimes or
crimes against humanity.77
Despite all these qualifications, the issue of genocide still has important political, diplo-
matic, and moral implications in the context of larger debates about colonialism, its long-term
consequences, and compensation claims frequently aired in the United Nations. The transnational
spill-over effects that impact the former colonial center should not be underestimated. For decades,
the moral and political condemnation of colonialism has met resistance from important pressure
groups in the colonial centers. These are still active in countries whose colonies gained independence
relatively late, like Portugal, France, or the United Kingdom. Germany lost its colonies after World
War I, and today lobby groups opposing a critical confrontation with the colonial past are almost
non-existent there. Instead, Herero and Nama victim groups enjoy considerable support from
German civil society, the media, and political parties. There is no principled opposition against
compensation claims, and the only controversial topic in the current bilateral negotiations between
Namibia and Germany is the amount of the compensation the latter is to pay. The question of
whether Germany’s colonial policy was genocidal is legally just as obsolete in the Namibian case






/hgs/article/35/2/235/6330489 by guest on 04 Septem
ber 2021
as it is in the Tanzanian one. Nevertheless, the genocide label has figured strongly in convincing
the German public of the moral claims of the Herero and Nama, and helped clear obstacles to the
current negotiations. It therefore seems likely that a convincing legal argument about the geno-
cidal character of the suppression of the Maji-Maji uprising would have similar consequences for
Tanzanian compensation claims and German domestic politics.
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February 8, 2021); “Tansania will keine Entschädigung von Deutschland für deutsche Kolonialzeit,”
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